Author(s): Torin Alter
Published: 10/19/2019
Journal Title:
Forthcoming and available in Early View in Nous
Abstract:
According to Russellian monism, consciousness is consti- tuted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then conscious- ness and such dispositional properties are closely con- nected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this makes its consciousness-constituting quiddities epiphenomenal—a disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating conscious- ness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaeg- won Kim’s well-known “exclusion argument.” We argue that neither succeeds.