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Dr. Torin Alter

-Russellian Monism and Mental Causation 

Dr. Torin Alter (The University of Alabama) and Sam Coleman (University of Hertfordshire, UK)

Forthcoming and available in Early View in Nous 

Abstract:

According to Russellian monism, consciousness is consti- tuted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then conscious- ness and such dispositional properties are closely con- nected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this makes its consciousness-constituting quiddities epiphenomenal—a disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating conscious- ness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaeg- won Kim’s well-known “exclusion argument.” We argue that neither succeeds.

 

-Russellian Physicalism and Protophenomenal Properties

Dr. Torin Alter (The University of Alabama) and Sam Coleman (University of Hertfordshire, UK)

Journal Article in Analysis 80, no.3, July 2020: 409-17

Abstract:

According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. On Russellian physicalism, those inscrutables are construed as protophenomenal properties: non-structural properties that both categorically ground dispositional properties and, perhaps when appropriately structured, collectively constitute phenomenal properties. Some (Morris 2016, Brown 2017) argue that protophenomenal properties cannot serve this purpose, given assumptions Russellian monists typically make about the modal profile of such properties. Those assumptions, it is argued, entail that protophenomenal properties are “experience specific”, i.e., that they are individuated by their potential to constitute phenomenal properties, and are thus not genuinely physical. However, we argue, that reasoning assumes that physical inscrutables must be individuated in terms of their (actual or possible) grounding roles. Not only is that assumption questionable: it is antithetical to Russellian monism.

 

-Physicalism Without Fundamentality 

Dr. Torin Alter (The University of Alabama)

Forthcoming and available in Early View in Erkenntnis. 

Abstract:

Physicalism should be characterized in a way that makes it compatible with the possibility that the physical world is infinitely decomposable. Some have proposed solving this problem by replacing a widely accepted No Fundamental Mentality requirement on physicalism with a more general No Low-Level Mentality requirement. The latter states that physicalism could be true if there is a level of decomposition beneath which nothing is mental, whereas physicalism is false otherwise. Christopher Devlin Brown (2017) argues that this solution does not work. He devises an infinitely decomposable possible world in which physicalism should come out as true even though there is mentality all the way down. I propose a solution that evades his argument. The key is to specify the sort of mentality that physicalism cannot abide at any level, namely, mentality that does not consist solely in a structural-dynamic arrangement of entities. I also argue that, if my arguments are sound, then the problem Brown identifies has significant implications for what is at stake in the debate over physicalism’s truth or falsity—implications he undersells.